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We analyse the determination of taxes on goods whose current consumption causes
utility costs (for example negative health e⁄ects) in the future. When consumers have
time-inconsistent preferences, they consume too much of such goods. Using ￿sin taxes￿
to correct distortions in the consumption of harmful goods when consumers have self-
control problems has also been considered in O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003; 2006).1
Market-based mechanisms for correcting the distortion caused by self-control prob-
lems are likely to be ine⁄ective (see K￿szegi (2005)), and consumers might thus value
sin taxes as a commitment device. In addition to the monetary cost of taxation, sin
taxes a⁄ect individual utility due to the corrective nature of the tax when preferences
are time-inconsistent. If this positive e⁄ect outweighs the monetary cost, sin taxes can
improve individual welfare - see Gruber and K￿szegi (2004) and Kotakorpi (2008) for
theoretical analyses and Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) for empirical evidence.
The main purpose of the current paper is to analyse how sin taxes are determined
in political equilibrium, and to compare the equilibrium tax with the socially optimal
level. Previous literature has focused on optimal taxes, and our analysis of equilibrium
sin taxes is therefore an important extension to the literature. Putting the paper
in a broader context, it provides a contribution to the nascent ￿eld of behavioural
political economy. We are aware of only a few earlier contributions in this ￿eld (Bassi
2008; Cremer et al. 2007; Frogneux 2009; Eisensee and Str￿mberg 2007; Osborne and
Rubinstein 2003). In a recent survey of literature in behavioural economics, DellaVigna
(2007) identi￿es political economics as one of the most promising ￿elds of further
research where behavioural economics could be more extensively applied.
In order to obtain a reference point to which the equilibrium sin tax is to be com-
pared, we ￿rst derive an expression for the optimal sin tax in a second-best setting:
That is, we assume that individuals di⁄er in their degree of self-control problems, but
a uniform tax is applied. Many economists have been concerned that sin taxes as well
as other paternalistic policies aimed at helping irrational individuals2 are often detri-
mental for the welfare of rational individuals.3 This has resulted in an emphasis on
1For an analysis of sin taxes within the broader context of non-welfarist optimal taxation, see
Kanbur, Pirttil￿ and Tuomala (2006).
2Throughout the paper, we refer to individuals with a self-control problem as irrational, as they
behave in an inconsistent manner and make consumption decisions that fail to maximise their own
life-time utility. Similar terminology has been used for example by O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2006).
3Beyond this concern, some economists remain sceptical about paternalism for more general reasons
- see for example Glaeser (2006) for a critical view. For example, the possibility of government failure
may reduce the e⁄ectiveness and desirability of paternalistic policies. Despite the importance of this
consideration, we abstract from this issue in the current paper. On the other hand, we show that
2a search for policies that help irrational individuals while having only a small or no
impact on those who are rational.4
However, it seems natural that economists should not restrict themselves to study-
ing minimal interventions, but we should also engage in analysing optimal paternalistic
policies. Indeed, there has recently been a move in this direction - see in particular
O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2006), who examine the conditions under which the optimal
utilitarian sin tax is positive, and provide some comparative statics of the optimal sin
tax when there are changes in the distribution of self-control problems. They also
analyse whether sin taxes can yield Pareto improvements (compared to zero taxes).
We analyse the trade-o⁄ between bene￿ts to irrational individuals and costs to
rational individuals further, and ￿nd the optimal balance between them by deriving
a formula for the socially optimal utilitarian sin tax. We ￿nd that even though the
social planner sets the corrective tax to maximise the expectation of individual welfare,
the second-best optimal sin tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control
problems in the economy. The reason is right at the heart of the recent discussion
on paternalism: for reasonable assumptions about the form of the demand function,
sin taxes have a relatively small (negative) e⁄ect on the utility of (close to) rational
individuals, who consume relatively little of the good. On the other hand, irrational
consumers with a very high level of consumption gain a lot from sin taxes.
We then turn to analyse the majority voting equilibrium. We assume that indi-
viduals are fully aware of their self-control problem, and vote on the sin tax to be
implemented from the next period onwards. Taxation can then provide a commitment
device that helps individuals move their consumption closer to its optimal level.
Sin taxes have two e⁄ects on consumer welfare and thus there are two mecha-
nisms that a⁄ect the consumer￿ s voting decision: Firstly, sin taxes correct (or distort)
consumption decisions (depending on whether the consumer su⁄ers from self-control
problems or not). Secondly, linear sin taxes redistribute income from irrational large-
scale consumers towards more rational consumers with a low level of consumption. As
a benchmark, we consider the case where tax revenue is distributed back to consumers
in such a way that the redistributive e⁄ects of taxation are eliminated. This setting
is unrealistic, as it requires personalised transfers and therefore information on each
consumer￿ s type. However, this analysis is useful in disentangling the corrective and
in our model consumers would themselves vote for paternalistic policies: such policies can therefore
be the outcome of a democratic decision making process, which has interesting implications for the
justi￿cation of paternalism.
4See for example Camerer et al (2003), Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and O￿ Donoghue and Rabin
(1999).
3redistributive roles of sin taxes, and in understanding how these two mechanisms a⁄ect
the determination of equilibrium taxes.
In the setting without redistributive e⁄ects, individuals prefer the level of taxes
that completely eliminates the distortion in their own consumption, and the political
equilibrium is the tax rate that corresponds to the median level of self-control problems.
We show that there is a bias in voting behaviour, which tends to make the equilibrium
tax too low: the asymmetric e⁄ect of sin taxes at di⁄erent ends of the distribution
of self-control problems is not taken into account by the median voter. However, in
this setting where sin taxes have no redistributive e⁄ects, there is one particular case
where the equilibrium and the social optimum coincide: this is when consumption is so
harmful that the optimal level of consumption is zero even in the absence of taxation.
In this case, it is in the interests of both the consumers and the social planner to
eliminate all consumption.
The main part of our analysis concerns the more realistic case where redistributive
e⁄ects of sin taxes are taken into account. On the one hand, an individual without self-
control problems will prefer a low tax, as high taxation would distort his consumption
choice. On the other hand, however, the redistributive e⁄ects of sin taxes provide a
reason for consumers with no self-control problems to vote for a high tax. Despite
these counteracting motives, we show that a majority voting equilibrium exists also in
this case, and corresponds to the tax rate preferred by the individual with the median
level of self-control problems.
Further, we show that when harmful health e⁄ects are mild, the redistributive
e⁄ects of sin taxes work rather well in aligning the median voter￿ s preferences with
those of the utilitarian social planner: even though equilibrium taxes are still typically
below the socially optimal level, the di⁄erence is small both in absolute terms and also
compared to the level of taxes. However, the mechanism seems to work well only at low
levels of harm, and the di⁄erence between the equilibrium and the optimum becomes
more pronounced when consumption is more harmful. Importantly, we show that when
redistributive e⁄ects of sin taxes are taken into account, the equilibrium tax rate tends
to be below the socially optimal level regardless of the level of harm from consumption.
Perhaps paradoxically, the redistributive motive for taxation implies that equilibrium
taxes are below the social optimum even when consumption is extremely harmful: in
this case the median voter does not consume the good in equilibrium, and simply wants
to maximise redistribution from irrational individuals towards himself. On the other
hand, the social planner wants to completely eliminate consumption.
One aim of our analysis is to contribute to the policy discussion on the taxation
4of harmful goods. In European countries, tobacco products are taxed much more
heavily than alcohol: the excise duty on the most popular brand of tobacco was on
average approximately 60 % of the total retail price in the EU-15 member states in
2003 (Cnossen and Smart 2005), whereas the corresponding ￿gure was 19 % for beer,
14 % for wine and 39 % for spirits (WHO 2004).5 It might appear that cigarette
taxes are too high from a social point of view, particularly as cigarette taxes in most
countries seem to exceed the external costs of smoking (Cnossen and Smart 2005).6
However, considering not only negative externalities, but also harm experienced but
not taken into account by the consumer himself, optimal taxes should indeed exceed
the level that would be appropriate if only externalities were taken into account. As our
analysis shows, the redistributive motive for taxation implies that equilibrium taxes on
highly harmful goods such as cigarettes may be too low from a social point of view.7
In addition to the previous literature on taxation when consumers have self-control
problems, our analysis has similarities with the analysis of commodity taxation in
the presence of externalities: negative health e⁄ects (in the case of consumers with
self-control problems) or "internalities"8, as well as negative externalities, are both
harmful e⁄ects not taken into account by consumers, and governments might wish to
alleviate these e⁄ects through taxation. Diamond (1973) has analysed optimal taxa-
tion of externality-generating goods when individuals give rise to di⁄erent (marginal)
externalities.9 In the case of externalities, however, there is no natural assumption to
make about how the magnitude of the marginal externality should be correlated with
individual demand. In our context, on the other hand, a high marginal internality is
naturally associated with high consumption, since consumers with a more severe self-
control problem have a higher level of consumption, ceteris paribus. This correlation
is the mechanism that drives many of the key results in this paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2
and derive the second-best optimal sin tax in Section 3. The political equilibrium is
5The ￿gures for alcoholic drinks were calculated using data for 9 countries only, as the ￿gures for
the rest of the EU-15 were not reported (see WHO 2004, 54). The average total tax collections in the
EU-15 member states were approximately 100 euros per adult in the case of alcohol, and around 280
euros per capita in the case of tobacco (see for example Cnossen (2006) and (2007)).
6In the case of alcohol, on the other hand, taxes appear to be lower than the level that would be
mandated even by externality considerations alone (Cnossen 2007).
7The relatively low prevalence of smoking suggests that cigarettes ￿t our category of highly harmful
substances (where most people abstain from consumption): smoking prevalence is around 20-30% in
most EU countries, whereas only around 15% of adult Europeans abstain from alcohol consumption
(Anderson and Baumberg 2006, European Commission 2004).
8See Herrnstein et al (1993).
9See Eerola and Huhtala (2008) for a recent contribution to the literature on the political economy
aspects of environmental policy.
5analysed in Section 4, where we ￿rst study the benchmark case where sin taxes have no
redistributive e⁄ects, and then extend the analysis to account also for the redistributive
e⁄ects of sin taxes. Section 5 brie￿ y discusses the possibility of using other mechanisms
besides linear taxes and lump-sum transfers to regulate the consumption of sin goods.
We also discuss the case where sin taxes not only have a corrective role, but are also
used for revenue raising purposes, and point out that our results hold also in this
setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model where consumers have a quasi-hyperbolic discount function (Laib-
son 1997), using a set-up that is similar to O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003; 2006). Life-
time utility of an individual is given by





where ￿i;￿ 2 (0;1) and ut is the periodic utility function. Individuals are therefore
assumed to be identical in all other respects, but they di⁄er in their degree of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. We assume that the quasi-hyperbolic discount factor ￿ has a
distribution function F(￿) with mean E (￿) and median ￿med: Throughout the paper
we consider the general case where ￿ has the support [￿L;￿H], with 0 ￿ ￿L < ￿H ￿ 1.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies that preferences are time-inconsistent: discount-
ing is heavier between today and tomorrow, than any two periods that are both in the
future.
We assume that individuals derive utility from a composite good (z), which is
taken as the numeraire, and another good (x) which is harmful in the sense that it
yields positive utility in the short-run, but has some negative e⁄ects in the long-run.
Speci￿cally, we assume that periodic utility is given by
ut (xt;xt￿1;zt) = v(xt) ￿ h(xt￿1) + zt; (2)
where v0 > 0;v00 < 0 and the harm function10 is characterised by h0 > 0 and h00 > 0: We
10As in O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2006), we assume that the marginal bene￿ts and marginal costs
of consumption are independent of past consumption levels. In such a setting, it is not essential that
the harm is modelled as occuring only in the period following consumption - h can be thought of as
the discounted sum of harm occurring in all future periods. See Gruber and K￿szegi (2004) for an
analysis where past consumption a⁄ects current marginal utility.
6therefore assume that the harm function is either linear or convex, so that incremental
consumption of goods such as alcohol is more harmful at high levels of consumption.
We assume that there is no borrowing or lending. Given this assumption and our
speci￿cation for the periodic utility function in (2), in each period t an agent whose
objective is to maximise (1) chooses xt so as to maximise u(xt) = v(xt)￿￿i￿h(xt)+zt.
Maximisation is subject to a per-period budget constraint qxt + zt ￿ B + S. We
assume that product markets are competitive and normalise the producer price to 1,
and q = 1+￿ denotes the consumer price of good x: B is the consumer￿ s income (taken
to be exogenous) and S is a possible lump-sum subsidy received by the consumer from
the government. Taxes and subsidies will be modelled in more detail in later sections.





￿) = q: (3)
However, the time-inconsistency in preferences implies that the consumer would like
to change his behaviour in the future: Maximising (1) from the next period onwards
would amount to maximising uo(x) = v (x)￿￿h(x)+z each period.12 Therefore, when
thinking about future decisions, the consumer would like to choose consumption levels
that maximise uo(x): We take this long-run perspective as the one relevant for welfare
evaluation - this has become a standard choice in the literature on sin taxes (see for
example Gruber and K￿szegi (2004), O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003; 2006)). There
are clear reasons that justify this choice of welfare criterion: Firstly, we assume that
taxes are implemented from the period after the policy decision is made. Therefore,
consumers themselves agree that uo(x) is the relevant utility function from the point
of view of tax policy, and voting decisions will be made based on maximising this
function. We thus use the same criterion consistently when deriving both the optimum
and the equilibrium level of taxes. Further, uo(x) is the utility function that applies to
all periods except for the present one. Since we consider an in￿nite number of periods,
the weight of any single period should be negligible as long as periods are su¢ ciently
short.13 This latter consideration applies irrespective of the timing of the model.
The optimal level of consumption therefore satis￿es v0(xo) ￿ ￿h0 (xo) = q: because
of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (￿ < 1); the equilibrium level of consumption of the
11We have dropped the time index t, since with our speci￿cation consumption is constant accross
periods.
12See equation (1) and think of a consumer in period t, making consumption decisions for period
t + 1 onwards.
13See also Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 4) for a discussion on this point.
7harmful good (x￿) is higher than the optimal level (xo):
3 The second-best optimal sin tax
We argued above that long-run utility is the appropriate welfare criterion in our model.
The social welfare function is then given by W (q) ￿
R ￿H
￿l G(V (q;￿))f(￿)d￿, where
V (q;￿) = uo(x￿ (q;￿)) is the long-run indirect utility function. Note again that max-
imising uo is identical to maximising (1) from the next period onwards, given our
speci￿cation for the periodic utility function (2). We assume that the function G(:) is
utilitarian, and the social welfare function therefore becomes14
W (q) =
R ￿H
￿l V (q;￿)f(￿)d￿ = E￿ [V (q;￿)]
= E￿ [v (x￿ (q;￿)) ￿ ￿h(x￿ (q;￿)) ￿ qx￿ (q;￿) + S (q;￿)] + B;
where x￿ satis￿es (3) and is therefore distorted whenever ￿ < 1, as argued above.
Taking into account the government￿ s budget constraint ￿E￿ [x￿ (q;￿)] = E￿ [S (q;￿)],
the social welfare function can be written as
W (q) = E￿ [V (q;￿)] = E￿ [v (x
￿ (q;￿)) ￿ ￿h(x
￿ (q;￿)) ￿ x
￿ (q;￿)] + B:
Given the distortion in consumption caused by quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the
government may consider imposing a sin tax on harmful goods as a corrective measure.




















where the last step was obtained by using (3).
As we consider a case where a uniform tax is applied, choosing the optimal tax in-
volves a trade-o⁄between helping consumers with a severe self-control problem, whilst
causing a distortion for those who are rational. From (4), the second-best optimal tax
is given by
14Note that we use the expectations operator for notational convenience to refer to the average of
the relevant variable.
8￿












It should be noted that the socially optimal tax rate is independent of the way in
which tax revenue is distributed back to consumers, that is, of the form of the function
S (￿;￿): Therefore, in both of the cases considered below - that is, regardless of whether
sin taxes have redistributive e⁄ects or not - the socially optimal tax rate is given by
(5).
The ￿rst term in the tax formula (5), ￿E [(1 ￿ ￿)h0 (x￿)]; is the average distor-
tion caused by self-control problems in the economy. The second term is basically the
covariance between the extent of the mistake made by an individual, and the respon-
siveness of his demand to price changes. It re￿ ects the fact that the weight the social
planner assigns to a consumer depends on how much a price change a⁄ects the quantity
of the sin good the consumer buys. Intuitively, if the consumer￿ s choices are virtually
una⁄ected by price changes, the sin tax can neither distort nor correct the consumer￿ s
choices. The larger the e⁄ect of a price change on the amount of sin goods consumed,
the more sin taxes correct or distort the consumer￿ s choices, and the higher the weight
given to the consumer in the optimal tax calculus.
It is shown in the Appendix that the second term in (5) is positive (negative) if
@2x￿(q;￿)
@q@￿ > (<)0. If
@2x￿(q;￿)
@q@￿ > 0; the impact of taxation on consumption is increasing
in the level of self-control problems, and vice versa if
@2x￿(q;￿)
@q@￿ < 0. In the rest of
the paper we assume that
@2x￿(q;￿)
@q@￿ > 0, which holds for commonly used functional
forms and is also supported by empirical evidence (see below). When this condition
holds, the demand of irrational consumers with a high level of consumption is more
responsive (in absolute terms) to price changes than the demand of rational consumers
with a low or moderate level of consumption . A basic rationale for this feature is
that as rational consumers consume relatively little of harmful goods in any case,
higher taxation cannot reduce their consumption much further. It is important to note
that the condition concerns absolute changes in demand. Even with this assumption,
demand can be less elastic for heavy users than for moderate consumers.
In the current and the next section, we make the following assumptions about the




Assumption 1 (i) v000 (x) ￿ 0 and (ii) ￿2 ￿
h000(x)h0(x)
[h00(x)]2 ￿ 1:
9Assumption 1 is satis￿ed for commonly used functional forms, for example when
v is of the CRRA or CARA-variety15 or quadratic, and when the harm function is
linear16, quadratic, exponential or h(x) = xs where s ￿ 4=3. We can now state the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 The socially optimal sin tax is higher than the average distortion caused
by self-control problems, that is, ￿o > ￿E￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)h0 (x￿ (q;￿))] .
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 1 therefore states that even though the social planner chooses the cor-
rective tax to maximise the expectation of individual welfare, the socially optimal tax
rate exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems in the economy.
The proposition has a very intuitive explanation. As was explained above, Assumption
1 implies that taxation has a larger impact on irrational consumers with a high level of
consumption than on rational consumers with a low or moderate level of consumption
. The bene￿t of a high sin tax for consumers with a severe self-control problem thus
exceeds the (negative) impact on the utility of (close to) rational individuals.
An important question of course is whether the condition
@2x￿(q;￿)
@q@￿ > 0 is likely to
hold for the demand for sin goods. The evidence that we require to judge the appro-
priateness of this condition is hard to ￿nd, as most studies on the demand for goods
such as alcohol and tobacco estimate iso-elastic demand functions, and therefore there
is no information on how the price responsiveness of demand varies across consumers
(or variation may be allowed according to dimensions such as age or gender) - see for
example Cook and Moore (2000) and Chaloupka and Warner (2000) for reviews of
demand studies on alcohol and tobacco. An important exception is Manning et al.
(1995), where the price elasticity of alcohol demand is allowed to vary between heavy
drinkers, moderate drinkers and light drinkers. More speci￿cally, Manning et al. use
individual-level data from the 1983 US National Health Interview Survey to estimate
the price elasticity of demand for each decile of drinkers. The evidence is broadly con-
sistent with assumption 1: even though the demand of both light and heavy drinkers is
less elastic than the demand of moderate drinkers, the absolute changes in demand are
uniformly increasing in the level of consumption for the vast majority of the population.
This evidence is reported in Table 1.
15Kimball (1990) provides an economic interpretation of the condition v000 > 0; albeit from a context
that is rather di⁄erent from ours: v000 > 0 is associated with the concept of prudence, and implies that
precautionary savings of risk averse individuals increase with increased uncertainty.
16Note that when the harm function is linear, part (i) of Assumption 1 has to hold as a strict
inequality.
10Table 1.Price responsiveness of demand for alcohol[1].
Percentile Daily ethanol Estimated Absolute
(among drinkers)[2] consumption (US ￿oz) price elasticity change
0 0,01 -0,5550 -0,0055
5 0,03 -0,5561 -0,0167
10 0,04 -0,5312 -0,0212
25 0,09 -0,8269 -0,0744
50 0,23 -1,1916 -0,2741
75 0,64 -0,8470 -0,5421
90 1,44 -0,4940 -0,7114
95 2,25 0,1213[3] 0,2729
[1]Source: Manning et al. (1995), Tables 4 and A.1.
[2]Manning et al. (1995) estimate price elasticities for each decile as well as the 5th and 95th
percentile of drinkers, whereas the information on daily ethanol consumption is given for the
percentiles reported here. We have obtained the elasticity at the 25th percentile by averaging
the elasticities at the 20th and 30th percentiles; similarly for the elasticity at the 75th percentile.
[3]The estimate is not statistically di⁄erent from zero (t=0.40).
The only deviation from the pattern of increasing responsiveness to price changes
occurs for the 95th percentile of drinkers, whose consumption is found to be completely
inelastic (the elasticity estimate is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero). The problem
that this might pose for our analysis is alleviated by a number of factors. Firstly, the
95th percentile of drinkers corresponds to 3% of the adult population (aged 17 or over),
and therefore the price responsiveness of demand is indeed increasing in the quantity
consumed for the vast majority of the population. Note also that what we need is
simply a correlation between harm from consumption and
@x￿(q;￿)
@q (see equation (5)),
and therefore
@x￿(q;￿)
@q does not necessarily have to increase monotonically. Further,
even if we are mainly interested in problem drinking, it is important to note that the
harmful e⁄ects of alcohol consumption become signi￿cant at consumption levels well
below the 95th percentile of drinkers (see for example Farrell et al. 2003). Further,
various undesirable outcomes associated with drinking (such as drunk driving or the
occurrence of diseases such as liver cirrhosis) have been found to be responsive to price
- see Cook and Moore (2000) for a review of the evidence.
4 Political equilibrium
From the consumer￿ s point of view, the problem is that he would like to consume
less in the future, but repeatedly fails to do so due to self-control problems. We
assume throughout the analysis that consumers are sophisticated - that is, they are
11completely aware of their self-control problem.17 However, market-based mechanisms
for correcting the distortion caused by time-inconsistent preferences are likely to be
ine⁄ective (see K￿szegi (2005)): even though both consumers and ￿rms would have the
incentive, ex ante, to sign contracts that implement the optimal level of consumption,
in a competitive market consumers cannot be prevented from purchasing from other
￿rms ex post. Consumption of harmful goods is therefore as if only a spot market was
available (that is, suboptimally high). To the extent that laws on commodity taxation
cannot be changed within a given period, sophisticated consumers might value sin taxes
as a way of committing to a lower level of consumption in the future.
In this section we analyse the level of taxes that will emerge in a political equilib-
rium and compare the equilibrium tax rate with the social optimum. We assume that
consumers vote over a sin tax to be implemented in all subsequent periods, starting
from the period following the vote. Another interpretation that would yield identical
results, would be that individuals vote each period on a tax rate that will apply in the
next period only.18
As utility from all subsequent periods is discounted exponentially, the individual￿ s
policy preference function is given by his indirect long-run utility function, V (q;￿i) =
uo(x￿ (q;￿i)) = v (x￿ (q;￿i)) ￿ ￿h(x￿ (q;￿i)) + z: the individual￿ s preferred tax rate is
the one that maximises his long-run utility, taking into account the fact that actual
consumption decisions will be distorted in the absence of a sin tax.
Finally, we assume that the outcome of the vote is determined by direct majority
rule.19
17The concepts of sophistication and naivete (complete unawareness of ones￿self-control problem),
were discussed already by Strotz (1955-6) and Pollak (1968) and have been recently analysed in
numerous papers - see for example O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for an analysis of the implications
of both sophistication and naivete, and O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2001) for a model that introduces a
formalisation of the intermediate case of partial naivete. Since there are no intertemporal linkages in
the marginal bene￿ts and costs of consumption in our model, consumption decisions (in the absence
of commitment) would be the same for naifs and sophisticates. However, voting decisions depend on
whether the individual is aware of his self-control problem: (partially) naive individuals would vote
for a lower tax than sophisticated individuals.
18If consumers were to vote on taxes only for this period, all consumers would vote for zero taxes;
and if they were to vote on taxes to be implemented forever but including the current period, they
would vote for a lower level of taxes than implied by the analysis below (the socially optimal level of
taxes would also be lower; see Gruber and K￿szegi (2004, 1967)) .
19The same results hold if there is a representative democracy with two-party electoral competition,
the parties can fully commit to a tax policy and care only about their chances of being elected (and
do not have preferences over the level of taxes themselves) - this would be a simple case of Downsian
electoral competition (Downs (1957); see also Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
124.1 Benchmark: sin taxes have no redistributive e⁄ects
Even though the social optimum is una⁄ected by the way in which tax revenue is distrib-
uted back to consumers, consumers clearly will not be indi⁄erent about the subsidies
that they receive. The shape of the function S (￿;￿) thus has an e⁄ect on the polit-
ical equilibrium. Consider ￿rst the case where the tax has no redistributive e⁄ects,20
namely S (￿;￿) = ￿x￿ (q;￿):21 The long-run indirect utility function of individual i
and therefore his policy preference function is then given by
V (q;￿i) = v (x
￿ (q;￿i)) ￿ ￿h(x
￿ (q;￿i)) ￿ (1 + ￿)x
￿ (q;￿i) + ￿x
￿ (q;￿i) + B (6)
= v (x
￿ (q;￿i)) ￿ ￿h(x
￿ (q;￿i)) ￿ x
￿ (q;￿i) + B:
where x￿ again satis￿es (3).
4.1.1 The case of moderately harmful consumption
In the case where sin taxes have no redistributive e⁄ects, the comparison between the
equilibrium and the social optimum turns out to depend on the extent of harm from
consumption. Let us ￿rst analyse the political equilibrium in the case where current
consumption causes harm in the future, but the optimal (rational) level of consumption
is nevertheless positive at zero taxes, that is v0 (0)￿￿h0 (0)￿1 > 0. Using similar steps
as in the previous section, the ￿rst-order condition is given by
@V (q;￿)
@q






and each individual￿ s preferred tax rate is given by
￿
￿ (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h
0 (x
￿ (q;￿)): (8)
We show in the appendix that the policy preference function (6) is single-peaked.
A majority voting equilibrium therefore exists and the tax rate preferred by the voter
with the median most preferred level of taxes is chosen in equilibrium. Further, policy
preferences are clearly monotonic in ￿: in the absence of redistribution, each individual
20In the present setting, it would also be possible to set individual-speci￿c taxes. However, this
case would not be very interesting, as there would then be no interpersonal trade-o⁄s to be settled.
The case of individual-speci￿c transfers is also rather unrealistic, but it is useful for illustrating some
of the key mechanisms in this paper, and serves as a benchmark for the more realistic case where sin
taxes have redistributive e⁄ects.
21It is important to note that S (￿;￿) is a lump-sum payment, and the consumer cannot change the
subsidy by deviating from x￿:
13prefers the tax rate that fully corrects the distortion in consumption. Since the distor-
tion term (1 ￿ ￿)￿h0 (x￿ (q;￿)) is decreasing in ￿, the individually preferred tax rate is
monotonically increasing in the level of self-control problems. Given this monotonicity,
the tax rate chosen in a majority voting equilibrium is given by
￿
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿med)￿h
0 (x
￿ (q;￿med)): (9)
We can now compare the tax rate chosen in political equilibrium, ￿￿; to the socially
optimal tax rate ￿o. Let us ￿rst examine a simple case, where the harm function is lin-
ear, namely h(x) = ￿x: In this case ￿￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿med): On the other hand, equation (5)












0: Then clearly ￿￿ < ￿o; as long as E [￿] < ￿med + ￿.
In the appendix, we show that the right hand side of (9) is lower than the right
hand side of (5) also for more general harm functions. The reader may worry that
since the tax formulas in (5) and (9) are given in implicit form, the result might be
related to tax rules, and not to actual tax levels. Limitations of this type are very
common in the optimal taxation literature, as noted by Boadway and Keen (1993)
and discussed by Gaube (2005). Using a Taylor-approximation of (7), we have further




@q ￿ 0 for all q, and therefore the result that
￿o > ￿￿ is robust to this objection, at least when the tax rates are low enough so that
the approximation used in the proof can be considered to be valid22. Given that we
are in the current subsection concerned with goods that are moderately harmful (and
tax rates should therefore not be very high), the approximation is likely to be fairly
innocuous. In cases where the approximation is not valid (but the good is still only
moderately harmful in the sense that the optimal level of consumption at zero taxes is
positive), the result concerning the tax rules is nevertheless guaranteed to hold23.
Proposition 2 Assume that sin taxes have no redistributive e⁄ects and the optimal










and e ￿ ￿ W (1) ￿ V (1;￿med). Now W (q) = V (q;￿med) +
R q
1 ￿(b q)db q + e ￿: The price level chosen in
the political equilibrium is q￿ = argmaxq V (q;￿med). Next we show that the socially optimal price
level qo = argmaxW (q) > q￿. (i) Assume by contrast that qo = e q < q￿. Now W (e q) = W (q￿) ￿
[V (q￿;￿med) ￿ V (e q;￿med)] ￿
R q
￿




@q +￿(q￿) > 0, where the inequality follows since
@V (q
￿;￿med)
@q = 0 and ￿(q￿) > 0.
Thus we can conclude that qo > q￿. Notice that this proof applies even if W (q) and V (q) are
multi-peaked.
23Note that in the case of a linear harm function, even the comparison of the tax rules gives an
unambiguous answer, as we then have an explicit expression for ￿￿.
14skewed to the right, the socially optimal tax rate is higher than the tax rate chosen in
a majority voting equilibrium:
Proof. See the appendix.
In particular the proposition holds for all left-skewed distributions.24 Empirically,
this is perhaps the most relevant case: most consumers are relatively rational, while a
minority has more severe self-control problems, so that E [￿] < ￿med:25 As the median
voter has smaller-than-average self-control problems, it is easy to understand that
his preferred tax rate is below the socially optimal rate. However, the proposition also
holds, when the distribution of self-control problems is symmetric, so that E [￿] = ￿med;
and the equilibrium tax rate may be lower than the socially optimal rate even when the
distribution of ￿ is right-skewed , so that the median voter has larger-than-average self-
control problems, or ￿med < E [￿]. To understand these results, remember that given
our assumptions, the self-control bene￿ts that irrational heavy-users obtain from high
sin taxes, exceed the welfare losses incurred by (nearly) rational consumers. As the
median voter ignores these asymmetric e⁄ects at the opposite ends of the distribution,
the equilibrium tax rate ￿￿ tends to be lower than the second-best optimal tax rate ￿o
under quite general conditions. If the distribution of ￿ were too much skewed to the
right, the equilibrium tax can be higher than the optimal tax.
4.1.2 The case of very harmful consumption
Consider next the case where consumption of commodity x is so harmful that the
optimal (rational) level of consumption is zero even at zero taxes, that is, v0 (0) ￿
￿h0 (0)￿1 ￿ 0. It is then immediately clear that, in the social optimum, no one should
consume x: The (minimum) tax rate (￿o) needed to implement the social optimum is
such that even the least rational consumer abstains, and it is given by
￿
o = v
0 (0) ￿ ￿L￿h
0 (0) ￿ 1: (10)
It is easy to see that the socially optimal sin tax is in this case also a majority
voting equilibrium for any distribution of ￿ and for all functional forms v(x) and h(x):
Proposition 3 Assume that sin taxes have no redistributive e⁄ects and the optimal
level of consumption at zero taxes is zero. The socially optimal tax is then a majority
24Throughout the paper, we say that the distribution of ￿ is left-skewed, if E [￿] < ￿med, and it is
right-skewed, if ￿med < E [￿]: This de￿nition is consistent with the Pearson measure of skewness.
25The distribution of ￿ is not observable, but some information on it can be obtained from the
distribution of x￿ (see p. 21-2 for a discussion).
15voting equilibrium:
Proof. Individuals with ￿i = ￿L strictly prefer ￿o to any tax rate below ￿o; and they
are indi⁄erent between ￿o and any tax rate ￿ > ￿o. All individuals with ￿i > ￿L
strictly prefer ￿o to any tax rate below ^ ￿ (￿i) = v0 (0)￿￿i￿h0 (0)￿1 and are indi⁄erent
between ￿o and any tax rate ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ (￿i):
That is, when it is optimal to abstain from the consumption of good x even in the
absence of any taxation, all consumers prefer a tax policy that will help them to achieve
a zero level of consumption. The socially optimal tax achieves this outcome and will
therefore be a majority voting equilibrium. However, we show in section 4.2.2 that this
result changes when we take into account the redistributive e⁄ects of sin taxes.
4.2 Accounting for the redistributive e⁄ects of sin taxes
Let us next analyse the more realistic case where the government does not have infor-
mation on individual consumption levels, so that the subsidy paid to each consumer
cannot be conditioned on individual consumption. We therefore assume from now on
that all consumers receive a lump-sum transfer of equal size, and this subsidy is given
by S (q;￿) = S (q) = ￿E￿ [x(q;￿)]: The consumers￿policy preference function is then
given by
~ V (q;￿i) = v (x
￿ (q;￿i)) ￿ ￿h(x
￿ (q;￿i)) ￿ qx
￿ + ￿E￿ [x
￿ (q;￿)] + B:
4.2.1 The case of moderately harmful consumption
Consider again ￿rst the case where current consumption causes harm in the future, but
the optimal (rational) level of consumption is nevertheless positive at zero taxes, that
is, v0 (0) ￿ ￿h0 (0) ￿ 1 > 0: The ￿rst-order condition that determines voting behaviour
of individual i is now given by26
@ ~ V (q;￿i)
@q







￿ (q;￿i) + E￿ [x




In the case where taxation had no redistributive e⁄ects it was easy to see that the
individual￿ s preferred tax rate was monotonic in the level of self-control problems and
26We assume that consumers have information on the aggregate demand for the sin good and how
it responds to price changes.
16a majority voting equilibrium was therefore guaranteed to exists. However, as noted in
the introduction, in the case where sin taxes have redistributive e⁄ects there are two
forces at play: on the one hand, a person with a high level of self-control problems will
prefer a high tax in order to alleviate the distortion in his consumption decision. The
corrective e⁄ect of taxation is identical to the case where sin taxes have no redistributive
e⁄ects, and is given by the ￿rst term in (11). On the other hand, however, a high tax
will also imply a transfer of income towards individuals with a relatively low level of
consumption: this redistributive e⁄ect of taxation is captured by the remaining terms
in (11).
Because of these two opposite e⁄ects, policy preferences may not be well-behaved,
and the existence of a majority voting equilibrium is therefore not self-evident in this
case. In particular, it is possible that policy preferences are not single-peaked: The
consumer chooses not to buy any of the sin good, once the price reaches a certain
level e q (￿i) = v0 (0) ￿ ￿i￿h0 (0). If e q (￿i) is lower than the tax rate that maximises tax
proceeds, say b q, utility may be hump-shaped for values of q < e q (￿i); then increasing
for e q (￿i) < q < b q (as the consumer now only cares about tax revenues) and decreasing
for q > b q.
Even if policy preferences are not single-peaked, a median voter equilibrium exists
if policy preferences satisfy the Gans-Smart single crossing property (Gans and Smart
1996). Gans and Smart show that when underlying preferences are de￿ned over a two-
dimensional real choice variable but attention can be restricted to a one-dimensional
choice due to production or budget constraints (in our case due to the government￿ s
budget constraint), then single-crossing in the Spence-Mirrlees sense implies single-
crossing in the Gans-Smart sense.
We therefore use the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition to analyse the exis-
tence of a median voter equilibrium. In our simple case of quasilinear preferences, the
Spence-Mirrlees condition amounts to
@ ~ V (q;￿i)
@q being monotonic in ￿: In the appendix,
we prove that
@ ~ V (q;￿i)
@q@￿ ￿ 0. We can therefore state the following proposition, which
holds regardless of whether preferences are single-peaked:
Proposition 4 Assume that revenue from sin taxes is distributed equally among con-
sumers. A majority voting equilibrium exists and the equilibrium sin tax is given by
the tax rate preferred by the consumer with the median level of self-control problems.
Proof. See the appendix.
The result
@ ~ V (q;￿i)
@q@￿ ￿ 0 implies that an individuals￿most preferred tax rate is again
monotonically increasing in the level of self-control problems. To gain some intuition on
17why this holds also when the redistributive e⁄ects of sin taxes are taken into account,








￿ (q;￿i) ￿ x
￿(q;1) + ￿(q;￿i); (12)
where ￿(q;￿i) =
R ￿H
￿i (1 ￿ ^ ￿)
@2x(q;^ ￿)
@b ￿
2 db ￿ > 0 and ￿(q;￿i) is increasing in the level of
self-control problems (decreasing in ￿). As expected, the corrective e⁄ect of the tax
is the larger, the more consumption x￿ (q;￿i) di⁄ers from the quantity chosen by the
rational consumer, x￿(q;1). Further, the magnitude of the corrective e⁄ect exceeds the
di⁄erence x￿ (q;￿i)￿x￿(q;1). Importantly, the di⁄erence between the corrective e⁄ect
and the monetary cost of the tax is increasing in the level of self-control problems:
therefore, relatively irrational individuals prefer a higher tax rate than those who are
relatively rational.
To illustrate, consider an example where v (x) = "
"￿1x
"￿1
" and h(x) = gx: With
these functional forms and using (3) to express ￿￿ in terms of x￿, the self-control bene￿t











It is easy to see from this expression that the self-control bene￿t increases more than
linearly with the quantity consumed, which in turn is an increasing and convex function
of self-control problems. Hence the self-control bene￿ts increase more rapidly than
monetary costs (which depend linearly on consumption), and the individuals￿preferred
tax rate is increasing in the level of self-control problems.
The speci￿c functional forms used in the previous example serve to illustrate the
mechanism behind Proposition 4. However, the property that self-control bene￿ts
increase more rapidly than monetary costs is more general, as Proposition 4 holds
for all functional forms that satisfy Assumption 1. The intuition is apparent when
we examine the three components that a⁄ect the magnitude of self-control bene￿ts:
Firstly, the harm function has been assumed to be either linear or convex. Secondly, the
sensitivity of demand to tax changes increases with self-control problems. Finally, these
two e⁄ects are multiplied by the level of self-control problems, (1 ￿ ￿i). Hence, these
three forces reinforce each other, causing the self-control bene￿ts to quite generally
increase more than linearly in the level of consumption.
It is interesting to note that even in the present case where the optimal level of
18consumption in the absence of taxes is positive, there may be circumstances under
which the redistributive motive for taxation implies that the median voter prefers not
to consume in equilibrium, and will vote for the tax rate that maximises revenue. We
have shown in the proof of Proposition 4, however, that single-crossing holds regardless
of whether the median voter consumes the good in equilibrium or not. Therefore there
cannot be situations where a coalition of near-rational users and highly irrational heavy-
users vote for highest taxes, and are pitted against voters with an intermediate degree
of rationality.27
Let us next turn to the comparison between the equilibrium and the optimum.
Proposition 4 implies that the equilibrium tax rate is now given by
￿
￿￿ =












The term E￿ [x￿ (q;￿)] ￿ x￿ (q;￿med) in the above formula captures the fact that if
x￿ (q;￿med) < E￿ [x￿ (q;￿)], sin taxes imply a transfer of income towards the median
voter. This will typically occur if the distribution of ￿ is skewed to the left so that
￿med > E [￿] (though it can also occur in other cases, depending on the exact functional
form of x￿). In such circumstances, the median voter then tends to vote for a higher
tax than he would in the absence of redistribution.
Also notice that, like the social planner, the median voter now cares about how









￿ ￿ ￿). These mechanisms contribute to aligning the
incentives of the median voter with the objectives of the utilitarian social planner.
When harmful health e⁄ects are mild, the mechanism based on transfers works re-
markably well. To see this, let h(x) = ￿g (x); where g0 >; g00 ￿ 0 and ￿ is a parameter
measuring the severity of harm from consumption: Using second-order Taylor approx-
imations around ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0; we show in the appendix that the following proposition
holds:
27It appears that this property might be related to our assumption of quasilinear preferences, and
the implied zero income elasticity of demand for good x. Whether more general assumptions about
preferences can give rise to voting coalitions where highly irrational consumers and fully rational
consumers vote for higher taxes than consumers with an intermediate level of rationality, is left as a
question for further research. See Epple and Romano (1996) for an analysis - albeit in a very di⁄erent
context - where the preferred level of public expenditure and taxation is non-monotonic in consumer
type (in their case income) when the income elasticity of demand exceeds the (absolute value of the)
price elasticity.
19Proposition 5 Assume that revenue from sin taxes is distributed equally among con-
sumers. Let h(x) = ￿g (x); where g0 > 0; g00 ￿ 0, and assume that ￿ is small. (i) The
di⁄erence between the socially optimal tax and the tax chosen in the political equilibrium
is of the second order (i.e. proportional to ￿2), whereas the tax rates themselves are of
the ￿rst order (i.e. they depend on ￿). (ii) When the distribution of ￿ is not too much
skewed to the right, the socially optimal tax rate is higher than the tax rate chosen in
a majority voting equilibrium:The di⁄erence between the tax rates is increasing in ￿.
Proof. See the appendix.
The ￿rst lesson from the above proposition is that for small levels of harm, the
di⁄erence between the equilibrium and the socially optimal tax rate (￿￿￿￿￿o) is small,
both in absolute terms and compared to the level of taxes. Note that this result holds
regardless of the distribution of self-control problems; in particular, it holds even when
the median voter is fully rational, and any sin taxes distort his consumption choices28.
In sum, when health e⁄ects are mild, the model predicts that actual sin taxes should
largely correspond to optimal sin taxes. In the appendix, we also contrast this result
to the benchmark case where sin taxes have no redistribute e⁄ects: in that case, the
di⁄erence between the equilibrium and the social optimum (￿￿ ￿ ￿o) is of the ￿rst
order as long as E [￿] 6= ￿med: In particular, if the median voter is nearly rational
(￿med ￿ 1), ￿￿ can be many times smaller than the socially optimal tax ￿o. These
results are illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Thus, under certain circumstances, a simple mechanism consisting of a linear sin tax
and a uniform transfer, can do a good job in inducing the median voter to internalise
both the self-control gains accruing to irrational heavy users, and the welfare losses
incurred by rational consumers, whose choices are distorted. The key to this result lies
in the fact that the level of consumption is correlated with the degree of self-control
problems. Above in Section 3 we saw that this correlation a⁄ects the level of the socially
optimal tax. Given this correlation, there is also a relation between a consumer￿ s self-
control gain from sin taxes, and the net transfer he receives, or pays. For example,
28Interestingly, at mild levels of harm, the equilibrium tax is close to the second-best optimal level,
even when people are naive, and are not aware of their future self-control problems. Then the median
voter - and indeed all voters - casts his vote believing that in the future he will not need sin taxes as a
commitment device (i.e. ￿ = 1 in all future periods). But at the same time he also thinks that he will
be at the receiving end of net transfers - a reason to vote for higher taxes. These two mistakes made
by the median voter cancel each other out. To get this result, we need to assume that the median
voter￿ s delusion only concerns his own future self-control: the voter does not think that other people




















Socially optimal Equilibrium Equilibrium, benchmark Revenue-maximizing
Figure 1: Sin taxes, when v (x) = Lx ￿ ￿
￿+1x
￿+1
￿ ; h(x) = ￿x; and xi = x(q;￿i) =
(maxf0;(L ￿ q ￿ ￿￿￿i)g)￿: We adopt the parameter values L = 5; ￿ = 2; ￿ =
0:95; while harm, ￿; varies between 0 and 6 (horizontal axis). We assume that ￿ is uni-


















for heavy-users than for moderate consumers. Also notice that no-one should consume
the sin good, if ￿ > (L ￿ 1)=￿ = 4:22:
assume that the median level of self-control problems ￿med di⁄ers considerably from
the average level E [￿]: Then the median self-control gain tends to di⁄er considerably
from the average gain in the population, but also the net transfer received - or paid -
by the median voter will be larger.
Nevertheless, the second part of the above proposition shows that the mechanism
that helps to align the incentives of the median voter with the objectives of the util-
itarian planner, is not perfect: as in the benchmark case studied in Section 4.1, the
equilibrium tax tends to be lower than the socially optimal tax. While small at low lev-
els of harm, we have shown in the appendix that this bias becomes more pronounced as



















Socially optimal Equilibrium Equilibrium, benchmark Revenue-maximizing
Figure 2: Sin taxes, when 30% of the consumers have no self-control problems (￿ = 1),
while among the remaining consumers ￿ is uniformly distributed over [0:2;1]; the
distribution is left-skewed, with ￿med > E [￿]. Other speci￿cations as in Figure 1.
after Proposition 4 above, of how and why the self-control bene￿ts typically increase
more than linearly in consumption. Looking at equation (12), the transfers induce the
median voter to internalise the part of self-control bene￿ts that is linear in consumption
(x￿ (q;￿i) ￿ x￿(q;1)); in contrast the non-linear part is not fully internalised.29
To put it slightly di⁄erently, we saw in Section 4.1 (see Proposition 2 and the dis-
cussion thereafter), that there are two factors that tend to make the equilibrium tax ￿￿
lower than the socially optimal tax ￿o: First, the equilibrium tax rate falls below the so-
cial optimum in particular if the median voter is relatively rational (￿med > E [￿]): The
discrepancy between the tax rates chosen by the median voter and the utilitarian social
planner will be the larger, the more ￿med di⁄ers from E [￿]: Second, sin taxes have a
larger e⁄ect on irrational heavy-users than on (nearly) rational consumers. Transfers
29Note that if we were to have a system whereby subsidies decrease more than linearly with con-
sumption (i.e. increase with the degree of rationality), we would likely get closer to the social optimum.
However, implementing such a scheme would require personalised subsidies and therefore each con-



















Socially optimal Equilibrium Equilibrium, benchmark Revenue-maximizing
Figure 3: Sin taxes, when 50% of the consumers have no self-control problems (￿ = 1),
while among the remaining consumers ￿ is uniformly distributed over [0:2;1]: Notice
that ￿med = 1, so that the median voter has no self-control problems. Other speci￿ca-
tions as in Figure 1.
induce the median voter to internalise the ￿rst factor: if ￿med di⁄ers considerably from
E [￿], also the net transfer will be large. However, due to the asymmetric e⁄ects of
taxes at the opposite ends of the distribution, the self-control bene￿t increases more
than linearly in consumption. This part is not internalised by the median voter.
The second part of Proposition 5 again holds if the distribution of ￿ is not too
much skewed to the right. In order to gain a more concrete feel of the di⁄erence
between optimal and equilibrium taxes, the tax formulas can be written in terms of
the distribution of consumption - the relevant formulas are given in the appendix.
This exercise is useful, since the distribution of consumption is observable, while the
distribution of self-control problems is not. The formulas in the appendix could thus
be used to take the model to real consumption data, and to examine the implications
of the model empirically. In the appendix, we show how the di⁄erence between ￿￿￿ and
￿o depends on the distribution of x￿ and on the elasticity of demand. For instance,
23it can be noted that the equilibrium tax ￿￿￿ is below the socially optimal level ￿o, if
average consumption x￿ exceeds median consumption x￿
med. Note that in the case of
tobacco, the median consumer abstains from consumption. Also in the case of alcohol,
the median level of consumption is typically much lower than the average - see for
example the evidence reported in Manning et al. (1995), where the mean consumption
of alcohol is six times the median. Also, the larger the variance in consumption, the
more the equilibrium rate will fall short of the socially optimal rate.
Even when the second-order Taylor approximations used in deriving the previous
proposition are not valid, we can show that the equilibrium tax rate is below the socially
optimal level, when certain conditions are met:
Proposition 6 Assume that revenue from sin taxes is distributed equally among con-
sumers. If (i) (1￿￿)
@2x(q;￿)
@￿2 is non-increasing in ￿; (ii) @x
@q ! 0, when x ! 0; and (iii)
the distribution of ￿ is not too much skewed to the right, the socially optimal tax rate
is higher than the tax rate chosen in a majority voting equilibrium:
Proof. See the appendix.
In the appendix, we show that if (1￿￿)
@2x(q;￿)
@￿2 is non-increasing in ￿, the derivative
(11) is not only increasing, but also a convex function of the level of self-control prob-
lems. The result therefore again has a very intuitive explanation: the convexity of (11)
implies that the marginal welfare bene￿t of high taxation for relatively irrational indi-
viduals is higher than the corresponding welfare loss for close to rational individuals.
The condition that (1 ￿ ￿)
@2x(q;￿)
@￿2 should be non-increasing in ￿ again holds for many
commonly used functional forms, for example when v is of the CRRA or CARA-variety
or quadratic, and when the harm function is linear or h(x) = xs where s ￿ 2.
Further, in order to interpret the condition that (1 ￿ ￿)
@2x(q;￿)
@￿2 should be non-
increasing in ￿, we show in the appendix that this holds (approximately) if a price
change a⁄ects the health of irrational consumers (heavy users) more than the health
of rational consumers. This holds given Assumption 1.
Condition (ii) in the proposition is needed if some individuals abstain from con-
sumption. The condition stipulates that, despite the possibility of abstention, the
derivative (11) is continuous, both in terms of the price q, and in terms of self-control
problems ￿.
Propositions 5 and 6 show that despite the fact that high sin taxes result in a
transfer of income towards the median voter, the equilibrium tax rate is typically lower
24than the socially optimal tax. Even though we argued above that the transfer mecha-
nism works well when harm from consumption is low, the income transfer is in general
not su¢ cient for the median voter to fully internalise the bene￿t that would accrue to
highly irrational individuals, if the tax rate was increased. It seems particularly note-
worthy that the di⁄erence becomes more pronounced when harm from consumption
increases. See again Figures 1, 2 and 3 for an illustration.
One force that tends to make the equilibrium tax fall below the optimum at high
levels of harm is the fact that when consumption is highly harmful, the median voter
consumes very little of the good and therefore is mainly interested in maximising tax
revenue in order to maximise redistribution from more irrational individuals towards
himself. The socially optimal tax on the other hand will be high, and will likely exceed
the revenue maximising tax: At high levels of harm, the sin tax tends to have only a
very small e⁄ect on the consumption choices made by (nearly) rational individuals -
the lower bound for consumption is zero - and the social planner￿ s objective essentially
boils down to correcting mistakes made by consumers with severe self-control problems.
A polar case is the one where consumption is so harmful that no-one should consume
the good in equilibrium, and the socially optimal tax is therefore so high that tax
revenue will be zero. Below, we show that in this case the equilibrium tax rate is too
low under very mild conditions.
4.2.2 The case of very harmful consumption
Consider again the case where consumption is so harmful that at zero taxes, the opti-
mal choice is to abstain from consuming the commodity x. The (minimum) tax rate
(￿o) needed to implement the social optimum is then given by (10).
The condition for the result ￿￿￿ < ￿o to hold in this case is especially mild, namely
that ￿med does not coincide with the lowest level of ￿. Further it is important to note
that this result does not depend on Assumption 1, but holds for any functional forms
of v(x) and h(x); such that v0;h0 > 0; v00 < 0 and h00 ￿ 0:
Proposition 7 Assume that revenue from sin taxes is distributed equally among con-
sumers and consumption is so harmful that the optimal level of consumption at zero
taxes is zero. Then, for any distribution of self-control problems where ￿med > ￿L,
the socially optimal tax rate is higher than the tax rate chosen in a majority voting
equilibrium.
Proof. Since no-one consumes at ￿ = ￿o, no tax revenues are collected in the social
optimum. Suppose that, starting from ￿ = ￿o, the tax rate is lowered by a small
25amount d￿. Then the least rational individuals (￿L); who were just indi⁄erent between
consuming and not consuming, are triggered to consume a small amount
x(￿L;￿
o ￿ d￿) = ￿
d￿
v00 (0) + ￿L￿h00 (0)
> 0:
Also, tax revenues increase from zero to ￿ ￿od￿
v00(0)+￿L￿h00(0)dF (￿L) > 0. Consumers other
than type ￿L still consume no x, and the welfare of this majority group increases, due
to transfers from type ￿L. The redistributive motive for taxation then implies that the
level of taxes that eliminates all consumption cannot arise as a political equilibrium.
5 Discussion
The current paper has analysed how linear sin taxes and transfers can be used to address
distortions in the consumption of goods with delayed negative e⁄ects when consumers
have time-inconsistent preferences. Concentrating on linear taxation and lump-sum
transfers is in line with most of the previous literature on sin taxes. One simple reason
for this focus is that linear taxes and lump-sum transfers are easily implementable.
Further, as our focus is on political economy and therefore on understanding existing
tax systems, concentrating on linear taxation seems particularly warranted (as tobacco
and alcohol taxes that we observe in reality are linear).
When the consumption decisions of di⁄erent individuals are subject to di⁄erent
distortions, the ￿rst-best could in principle be achieved through personalised taxation.
This would however require that personal consumption levels are observable to the
authorities. As the assumption of observable individual consumption levels is in most
situations untenable, not only the literature on sin taxes but also the previous literature
on optimal taxation more generally has been restricted to the case where commodity
taxation is assumed to be linear (see for example Cremer et al. 2001).
Assume, for instance, that we wished to implement a system where consumers with
a high level of self-control problems face higher taxes than consumers with low self-
control problems. This scheme is however subject to a similar objection as systems
involving ￿rst degree price discrimination more generally: ex post there would be
incentives to create a secondary market, where individuals with serious self-control
problems buy the sin good from individuals with mild self-control problems. Further,
in this situation it is not clear whether individuals have the right incentives even ex
ante: it may be pro￿table to understate one￿ s level of self-control problem in order
26to obtain a low tax, and then make a pro￿t by re-selling some of the sin good in the
future. Also social networks can undo the e⁄ects of personalised sin taxes: Ex post
there are incentives to ask a friend or a family member with a lower tax rate to do the
shopping.
Recently, Cowell (2009) has discussed the possibility of using smart cards to cir-
cumvent the information constraints in the implementation of non-linear commodity
taxation. Considering the particular case of sin goods, O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2005)
discuss the possibility of using sin licenses that individuals can purchase in order to
commit themselves to a given level of consumption in the future. However, for this
mechanism to work, re-selling the sin licences as well as the sin good itself would again
have to somehow be prohibited. The design and implementation of optimal screening
mechanisms to alleviate the distortions caused by time-inconsistent preferences is an
interesting issue for further research.
Another very interesting question for future research would be to analyse whether
quantity restrictions can do better than taxation in regulating the consumption of
harmful goods. Our analysis appears to provide an argument for quantity restrictions
on the consumption of certain highly harmful substances (such as illicit drugs), as the
discrepancy between the optimum and equilibrium taxes is particularly stark in this
case and consumption will be suboptimally high. However, if re-selling the sin good is
possible, it seems that optimal quantity restrictions may not be implementable through
the political process either: relatively rational individuals may then have an incentive
to vote for a quantity restriction that is too loose from the social point of view, as they
can later make a pro￿t on re-selling the good to individuals with self-control problems.
A full analysis of quantity vs. price regulation of the consumption of harmful goods,
as well as other possible regulatory mechanisms such as advertising bans, is left as an
issue for further research.
Finally, a central issue in previous literature on corrective taxation has been the
question of how optimal taxes are a⁄ected when taxation not only has a corrective role,
but taxes are also used to ￿nance public expenditure - see e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994) on taxation in the presence of externalities and O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2006)
for a short comment on this issue in the context of sin taxes. In an earlier version of the
paper (Haavio and Kotakorpi 2007) we have shown that our analysis generalises to the
case where sin taxes are also used for revenue raising purposes: it can be shown that a
result similar to proposition 6 holds also in this case, and equilibrium taxes therefore
tend to be lower than optimal taxes. Perhaps surprisingly, the result regarding the
comparison between ￿￿ and ￿o holds both when tax revenue is used to ￿nance public
27expenditure, as well as in the case where a part of tax revenue is wasted (for example
due to administrative costs).
6 Conclusions
We have shown that optimal sin taxes will typically exceed the average distortion caused
by self-control problems in the economy: this result arises due to the asymmetric e⁄ects
of sin taxes on the welfare of those with severe self-control problems on the one hand,
and on (close to) rational individuals on the other hand. We have argued that under
reasonable assumptions, the demand of irrational large-scale consumers is (in absolute
terms) more responsive to taxation than the demand of rational individuals with a low
level of consumption. Therefore, the positive welfare e⁄ect of taxation on irrational
consumers typically exceeds the negative impact on rational consumers. The median
voter, however, does not take such asymmetries into account. There is therefore a
bias in voting behaviour, which implies that the sin tax chosen in a majority voting
equilibrium tends to be below the socially optimal level.
When harmful health e⁄ects are mild, the redistributive e⁄ects of sin taxes work
rather well in aligning the median voters￿preferences with those of the utilitarian social
planner, and the di⁄erence between the equilibrium and the social optimum tends to
be small. However, this mechanism works well only at low levels of harm, and the
di⁄erence between the equilibrium and the optimum becomes more pronounced when
consumption is more harmful. In cases where consumption is extremely harmful, the
redistributive e⁄ects of sin taxes in fact contribute towards a more severe divergence
between the equilibrium and the optimum: The median voter then consumes very little
(or none) of the good in question, and is therefore mainly interested in maximising tax
revenue in order to maximise redistribution from more irrational individuals towards
himself. The socially optimal tax on the other hand will be very high, and will be
likely to exceed the revenue maximising tax in such circumstances.
The view that emerges from previous empirical literature seems to be that for ex-
ample excise duties on cigarettes are in most countries very high compared to the
external costs of smoking. However, the present analysis provides a theoretical argu-
ment suggesting that such taxes may nevertheless be too low from a social point of
view.
Finally, it should be noted that throughout the analysis, we have assumed that
individuals are sophisticated - that is, they are fully aware of their self-control problem.
Individuals thus value sin taxes as a self-control device, and vote for positive taxes.
28However, if some individuals are partially naive, their preferred tax rate will be lower
than the level indicated by our results. In the case where some individuals are either















v00 (x￿) ￿ ￿￿h00 (x￿)
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[v00 (x￿) ￿ ￿￿h00 (x￿)]
2 :
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29Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof, we ￿rst show that the policy preference function (6) is single-peaked.
Secondly, we show that the right hand side of (5) is larger than the right hand side of




@q ￿ 0. Finally, we
interpret this condition, and use an approximation to show that it holds in our model.
(i) To prove that (6) is single-peaked, we have to show that
@2V (q;￿)
@q2 < 0, whenever
@V (q;￿)
@q = 0: the non-existence of interior minima implies single-peakedness. To show
that
@2V (q;￿)
@q2 < 0 when
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(ii) In the text we show that the proposition holds for a linear h(x). If h(x) is not
linear, then
E￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)h
0 (x
￿ (q;￿))] 6= (1 ￿ ￿med)h
0 (x
￿ (q;￿med))
even if ￿med = E [￿]. In particular, if ￿(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)h0 (x￿ (q;￿)) is a convex function
of ￿, then the Jensen inequality implies that
E￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)h
0 (x
￿ (q;￿))] > (1 ￿ E [￿])h
0 (x
￿ (q;E [￿])):
We therefore need to show that
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It can be shown that
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2 ￿ ￿2: (18)
:
Therefore ￿(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)h0 (x￿) is a convex function of ￿ if v000 (x) ￿ 0 and (18)
holds (su¢ cient conditions). The condition (18) essentially states that h000 (x) should
not be too small, or equivalently, h0 (x) should not be too concave: harm and therefore
also self-control bene￿ts from consumption depend on h0 (x). Excessive concavity of
h0 (x) might thus o⁄set the e⁄ect of increasing sensitivity to taxation as self-control
problems get worse.




@q ￿ 0 for all q ￿ 1+￿￿. For the remaining
proofs, we ￿nd if useful to adopt the notation
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿;
where ￿ measures the degree of self-control problems directly: for fully rational con-
sumers ￿ = 0; and for fully myopic consumers ￿ = 1.
Using (15),
@V (q;￿)
@q can therefore be written as
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@q for all q. Also, since
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￿med ￿ E [￿]: (21)
Therefore the equilibrium tax is lower than the socially optimal tax if (20) and (21)
hold (su¢ cient conditions).







This is the e⁄ect of a price change on health. First-order Taylor series approximation











(note that the derivatives are evaluated at (q;￿)): Solving the above expression for
￿
@x￿(q;￿)








The second term in this expression is a constant. Therefore, ￿(q;￿) is increasing
in ￿, if
@x￿(q;￿)
@￿ is increasing in ￿. Condition (20) therefore states that a price change
a⁄ects the health of irrational consumers (heavy users) more than the health of rational






















The inequality follows from Assumption 1, which implies that
@2x(q;￿)
@q@￿ < 0.
Even when the rational level of consumption at zero taxes xo is positive, some
32people may abstain when a positive sin tax is set. Next we show that, if condition (20)
is satis￿ed, W (q) >
@V (q;￿med)
@q even in this case. Assume that at price level q consumers
with ￿ ￿ e ￿(q) abstain, where the critical level of self-control problems e ￿(q) is given by
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@q for ￿ > e ￿(q)
0 for ￿ ￿ e ￿(q)
:
Next, clearly ￿ ￿ e ￿(q)￿h0 (x￿(q;￿)) > 0: since type e ￿(q) abstains, the actual tax rate
is evidently higher than his preferred tax rate. As a consequence there may be a
















where strict inequality holds if lim￿!e ￿(q)+
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@q for ￿ ￿ e ￿(q)
Clearly,
@b V (q;￿)
@q is continuous in ￿; moreover
@b V (q;￿)
@q is constant over the range ￿ 2
[￿L;e ￿(q)], and it is increasing and convex (if the condition (20) applies) in ￿, when ￿ >
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for all ￿ ￿ ￿￿ if condition (20) is satis￿ed and ￿med ￿ E [￿]. The inequality (23) may
hold even when ￿med > E [￿]:
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, we have to show that the
Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition is satis￿ed. Since we assume quasi-linear
preferences this reduces to showing that
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q is monotonic in ￿.





















Substituting (15) and (24) into (11) shows that
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q
=








2 db ￿: (25)





@￿2 ￿ 0: (26)
Notice that these results hold even when some individuals do not consume in
equilibrium, that is, x(q;￿) = 0 for ￿ 2 [￿L;e ￿(q)]; where e ￿(q) is given by v0 (0) ￿
(1 ￿e ￿(q))￿h0 (0) ￿ q = 0: Then
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q
=
@ ~ V (q;￿L)
@q





for ￿ 2 [￿L;e ￿(q)] (27)
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q
=











2 db ￿ for ￿ > e ￿(q) (28)
and it is easy to see that
@2 ~ V (q;￿)
@q@￿ = 0 for ￿ 2 [￿L;e ￿(q)), and
@2 ~ V (q;￿)
@q@￿ = ￿
@2x(q;￿)
@￿2 ￿ 0 for
￿ > e ￿(q): There may be a discontinuity at ￿ = e ￿(q), but since e ￿(q)
@x(q;e ￿(q))
@￿ ￿ 0 it
follows that lim￿!e ￿(q)￿
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q ￿ lim￿!e ￿(q)+
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q ; so that
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q is non-decreasing in
￿ even at this point.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let let h(x) = ￿g (x); where g0 >; g00 > 0: Then
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Taking a second-order Taylor approximation around ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0 yields
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where b x; the level of consumption at zero harm and zero sin taxes, is implicitly given




v00(b x) > 0: To derive sin tax formulas, when ￿ is
small, we stipulate that
￿ = a￿ + b￿
2 (30)
where a and b are unknown coe¢ cients to be determined. The socially optimal tax
￿o and the equilibrium tax ￿￿￿ are given by the equations E￿
h




@ ~ V (q￿￿;￿med;￿)
@q = 0, respectively: To determine the coe¢ cients a and b; we plug in (29)
and (30) , and require that the sum of ￿rst order terms (which are proportional to ￿)
is zero. Similarly, the sum of second order terms (which are proportional to ￿2) must
be zero. In the computations, we ignore higher order terms, which are proportional to
￿3 or ￿4. We get
￿
o = E [￿]g
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With any distribution of self-control problems (￿) the ￿rst-order term in the tax
formulas is identical, E [￿]g0 (b x)￿￿; and the di⁄erence between the socially optimal tax
and the tax chosen in the political equilibrium is of the second order, i.e. proportional to
￿2. This can be contrasted with the benchmark case with no redistribute e⁄ects: when










35and the di⁄erence ￿￿ ￿ ￿o is of the ￿rst order, i.e. proportional to ￿, as long as
￿med 6= E [￿]:















Clearly, ￿￿￿ < ￿o, whenever ￿med ￿ E [￿] + ￿; where ￿ > 0 depends positively on
var(￿): the more dispersed the distribution of self-control problems is, the more likely
it is that the equilibrium tax rate is lower than the optimal tax rate. Notice also that
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿o < 0 i⁄ ￿(￿) ￿
￿2
med￿(E[￿])2
var(￿) < 1. Here ￿(￿) essentially measures the skewness
of the distribution (it is similar to the Pearson skewness measure
3(￿med￿E[￿])
sd(￿) ):
Next, using a ￿rst order Taylor approximation around ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0 yields







This equation allows us to express ￿med; E [￿] and var(￿) in terms of the distribution













































2 ￿ (x ￿ xmin)
2 ￿ var(x)
b x2 ; (37)
where xmin = x(q;1), xmax = x(q;0); xmed = x(q;￿med) and x = E￿ [x(q;￿)] are
the minimum, maximum, median and average level of consumption in the economy.
Since the di⁄erence between the tax rates ￿o and ￿￿￿ is of the second order (i.e. pro-
portional to ￿2), these consumption levels are identical, up to a ￿rst order approx-
imation, under tax rates ￿o and ￿￿￿: Thus when ￿ is small, the right-hand sides of
the tax formulas (35) and (36) are comparable. Also notice that it is su¢ cient to
use a ￿rst order Taylor approximation of x(q;￿) (eq (34)) to derive the formulas (35)






2var(￿)￿2 is of the second order, and the terms
(x ￿ xmin)(xmax ￿ xmin); (xmed ￿ xmin)
2 and (x ￿ xmin)
2 are proportional to ￿2; as well.
36Interpreting the remaining terms in formulas (35) and (36) , j￿j is (the absolute
value of) the price elasticity of demand (evaluated at ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0), and ’ =
g00(b x)
g0(b x) b x













depends on the level of consumption.
Given our assumptions, tax changes entail larger health e⁄ects for heavy-users than
for moderate consumers, and thus ￿ > 0: In particular, equation (37) indicates that
the equilibrium tax ￿￿￿ is below the socially optimal level ￿o, if average consumption x
exceeds median consumption xmed. Also, the larger the variance in consumption, the
more the equilibrium rate will fall short of the socially optimal rate.
Proof of Proposition 6
From (25), (27) and (28)
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q is a quasi-convex function of ￿; if (i) ￿
@2x(q;￿)
@￿2 is in-
creasing in ￿ and (ii) @x
@q ! 0, when x ! 0: In particular, due to assumption (ii),
@x(q;e ￿(q))
@￿ = ￿h0 (x(q;e ￿(q)))
@x(q;e ￿(q))
@q = 0; and (28) simpli￿es to
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q











2 db ￿ for ￿ > e ￿(q)
so that there is no discontinuity at ￿ = e ￿(q): Then, since
@ ~ V (q;￿)





; and quasi-convex in ￿ for ￿ > e ￿(q); we can conclude that
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q is a
quasi-convex function of ￿ over the whole support [￿L;￿H]: Given the quasi-convexity
of
@ ~ V (q;￿)
@q , the same argument as in the Proof of Proposition 2 shows that
dW(q)
dq >
@ ~ V (q;￿med)
@q :
To interpret the condition that ￿
@2x(q;￿)
@￿2 should be increasing in ￿, a ￿rst-order













Again, we therefore require that a price change a⁄ects the health of irrational consumers
(heavy users) more than the health of rational consumers.
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